The rise of investor-state arbitration [e-book] : politics, law, and unintended consequences / Taylor St John.
Tipo de material: TextoEditor: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018Descripción: 1 recurso electrónico (xiv, 285 páginas)ISBN: 9780191831553Tema(s): Inversiones extranjeras (Derecho internacional) -- Libros electrónicos | Arbitramento comercial internacional -- Libros electrónicos | Derecho comercial internacional -- Libros electrónicos | Inversiones extranjeras -- Tratados -- Libros electrónicosClasificación CDD: LE341.59 Recursos en línea: Acceso en línea
Contenidos:
International officials and the rise of ISDS: a historical institutionalist account -- Gunboats and diplomacy: antecedents of the ICSID Convention -- Intergovernmental bargaining: “The lowest common denominator was not yet low enough” -- Supranational agenda-setting: The World Bank’s “Modest Proposal” -- Intergovernmental discussion and ratification of ICSID -- Layering: how investor-state arbitration was added to investment treaties -- Conversion: America embraces investor-state arbitration -- Why is exit so hard? positive feedback and institutional persistence.
Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Libro Electrónico | Biblioteca General Libros electrónicos | Colección General | LE341.59 S774R 2018 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Ej. 1 | Disponible (Acceso Disponible) | 238864-1001 |
Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas 262-280) e índice.
International officials and the rise of ISDS: a historical institutionalist account -- Gunboats and diplomacy: antecedents of the ICSID Convention -- Intergovernmental bargaining: “The lowest common denominator was not yet low enough” -- Supranational agenda-setting: The World Bank’s “Modest Proposal” -- Intergovernmental discussion and ratification of ICSID -- Layering: how investor-state arbitration was added to investment treaties -- Conversion: America embraces investor-state arbitration -- Why is exit so hard? positive feedback and institutional persistence.
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